Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption KeysBadUSB - On Accessories that Turn Evil by Karsten Nohl + Jakob LellBreaking the x86 Instruction SetDEF CON 26  - Christopher Domas - GOD MODE UNLOCKED Hardware Backdoors in redacted x8611 videos · 9 hr 33 min
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Who Watches the Silicon?

Curated by Claude · 11 videos · 9 hr 33 min

A descent through the layers of a computer you cannot see or audit, ordered from the peripherals inward to the CPU, its secret co-processors and firmware, then out to the board and the supply chain. Most of these are HN gems with modest view counts, and HN brings them up whenever Intel ME, backdoors or hardware trust come up. It ends with the defender's view: how Microsoft built a console meant to survive people with soldering irons.

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  1. 1
    Video frame: Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys5:22

    Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

    pucitp · Picked by 1 · 2011–2020

    A five-minute Princeton demo that encryption keys survive in DRAM after power-off, a quick first sign that the hardware doesn't behave the way you assume.

  2. 2
    Video frame: BadUSB - On Accessories that Turn Evil by Karsten Nohl + Jakob Lell44:31

    BadUSB - On Accessories that Turn Evil by Karsten Nohl + Jakob Lell

    Black Hat · Picked by 1 · 2014–2019

    Nohl and Lell reprogram USB controller firmware to impersonate other devices, which HN treats as the standard reference for why any USB stick is a computer you don't control.

  3. 3
    Video frame: Breaking the x86 Instruction Set44:29

    Breaking the x86 Instruction Set

    Black Hat · Picked by 9 · 2017–2022

    Christopher Domas fuzzes the processor itself with Sandsifter and finds undocumented instructions; HN calls it easy to follow and entertaining.

  4. 4
    Video frame: DEF CON 26  - Christopher Domas - GOD MODE UNLOCKED Hardware Backdoors in redacted x8646:04

    DEF CON 26 - Christopher Domas - GOD MODE UNLOCKED Hardware Backdoors in redacted x86

    DEFCONConference · Picked by 4 · 2019–2026

    The follow-up: a hidden alternate instruction set on a real x86 chip that bypasses privilege rings, the talk HN brings up in every CPU-backdoor thread.

  5. 5
    Video frame: Joanna Rutkowska: Towards (reasonably) trustworthy x86 laptops1:02:52

    Joanna Rutkowska: Towards (reasonably) trustworthy x86 laptops

    media.ccc.de · Picked by 2 · 2016–2019

    Rutkowska steps back from single bugs to ask whether an x86 laptop with Intel ME can be trusted at all, and one HN commenter labeled it essential.

  6. 6
    Video frame: Replace Your Exploit-Ridden Firmware with Linux - Ronald Minnich, Google38:03

    Replace Your Exploit-Ridden Firmware with Linux - Ronald Minnich, Google

    The Linux Foundation · Picked by 6 · 2017–2023

    Google's Minnich explains UEFI as a large closed attack surface and why his team wanted to replace it with Linux, the firmware talk HN keeps linking.

  7. 7
    Video frame: USENIX ATC '21/OSDI '21 Joint Keynote Address-It's Time for Operating Systems to Rediscover Hardware1:06:20

    USENIX ATC '21/OSDI '21 Joint Keynote Address-It's Time for Operating Systems to Rediscover Hardware

    USENIX · Picked by 12 · 2021–2026

    Timothy Roscoe zooms out to show how much of a modern SoC runs below and beside Linux, which HN found revelatory and which explains why the earlier talks were possible.

  8. 8
    Video frame: BlueHat IL 2019 - Andrew "bunnie" Huang - Supply Chain Security: "If I were a Nation State...”45:38

    BlueHat IL 2019 - Andrew "bunnie" Huang - Supply Chain Security: "If I were a Nation State...”

    Microsoft Israel R&D Center · Picked by 6 · 2019–2024

    Leaving the chip for the board: bunnie gives a measured, technical look at how realistic a hidden implant is, written in the wake of the Supermicro story.

  9. 9
    Video frame: Defcon 21 - Decapping Chips The Strike Easy Hard Way1:41:27

    Defcon 21 - Decapping Chips The Strike Easy Hard Way

    HackersOnBoard · Picked by 3 · 2014–2025

    Laurie and Franken show how to take a chip's package off and read its ROM from the die, the practical answer to whether you can just look inside.

  10. 10
    Video frame: 36C3 -  Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware1:00:46

    36C3 - Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware

    media.ccc.de · Picked by 2 · 2020–2023

    bunnie's harder conclusion is that checking hardware destroys it, so even open designs leave a time-of-check/time-of-use gap, and he sketches what might narrow it.

  11. 11
    Video frame: Guarding Against Physical Attacks: The Xbox One Story — Tony Chen, Microsoft58:05

    Guarding Against Physical Attacks: The Xbox One Story — Tony Chen, Microsoft

    Platform Security Summit · Picked by 8 · 2019–2026

    The defender gets the last word: a mostly successful design, built to make any hardware attack cost more than buying the games, and HN's standard reference for it.