36C3 - Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware
media.ccc.de2 HN recommenders · 2020–2023
13K views · talk · evergreen · Uploaded 2019-12-27
A 36C3 talk by Bunnie Huang arguing that open source is necessary but not sufficient for trustworthy hardware, because verifying hardware is destructive and so creates a time-of-check/time-of-use gap. It surveys supply chain security and classes of hardware attacks, and presents the Betrusted approach to narrowing that gap.
HN commenters point to it whenever the question is how far hardware can be trusted, including FPGAs, supply chain attacks and firmware TPMs.
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4 comments from Hacker News
Here's an excellent talk that addresses your question: Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware [1]. [1] [VIDEO]
Here's an excellent talk that addresses your question: Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware [1]. [1] [VIDEO]
There’s really no way to ever be 100% sure of hardware. Sure we could use FPGAs for all hardware and then the hardware “source” is software, but who makes the FPGAs? There’s techniques even under X-ray to mask a rogue chip. [VIDEO]
As I'm sure you're aware FPGAs are nice because they can complicate things for an attacker in the physical supply chain. Andrew "bunnie" Huang did an excellent talk on the subject: [VIDEO]